Archive for the 'BREXIT' Category


New poll finds increasing support for a second referendum with 66% of REMAIN voters now wanting one

Saturday, March 25th, 2017

But overall most of those sampled continue to be against

Keiran Pedley looks at new poll numbers from the Polling Matters / Opinium series ahead of the Prime Minister invoking Article 50 this week.

Listeners to this week’s (revamped) PB/Polling Matters podcast (see below) will know that we have a new survey out this week. Our most recent poll tracks public opinion on last year’s Brexit vote. In December, we asked a nationally representative sample of the British public whether they thought there should be another vote on EU membership once the terms of divorce are known and we asked the same question again last weekend.

In some ways the results offer something for everyone. At a headline level, a majority are opposed to another referendum, with exactly the same number in opposition now as were opposed in December (52%). This is primarily because Leave voters continue to be committed to the decision they made last year. However, there has been a 5 point increase in the overall number in favour of another vote. This appears to be driven by those that said ‘don’t know’ in December now saying that they support another referendum with Remainers particularly consolidating behind such a position.

Q. Once we know what terms the government has negotiated, should there be a second referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU, where voters can choose between leaving under the terms negotiated or remaining in the EU after all?

Now for a number of reasons we shouldn’t get too exercised by these findings. These results could be a one-off and there is little sign of consistent Brexit regret in opinion polls. Theresa May certainly has no interest in holding another referendum and the Labour Party is not calling for one (despite some 60% of their voters in favour). However, we should still keep an eye on these numbers. If this trend is real and continues then expect someone of signifance in the Labour Party to come out in support in the future. In any case, if the opinion of the Remain vote is hardening on this subject, the potential for that group of people being a significant organised political force in the longer term only grows.

Incidentally, a fascinating subplot in Britain’s political future will be how the opinion of Millennials evolves on this issue. 53% of 18-34s support another vote with just 34% opposing. Now this shouldn’t surprise given what we know about the composition of the Remain vote in 2016. The question is whether such attitudes will change as these voters get older or are they set in stone (as they are on certain cultural issues)? If they are, expect the issue of Britain’s position in Europe be a live one long beyond we have officially left the EU.

Article 50 brings sky-high expectations

Turning our attention to this week, our poll also asked how confident the British public is on the type of Brexit deal May and the government will deliver:

How confident are you that Theresa May and the British government will be able to negotiate a Brexit deal that is good for the UK?

49% Confident

41% Not confident

 10% Don’t know

Expectations here are split in ways you would expect that I won’t therefore dwell on e.g. Remain vs Leave, Labour vs Conservative, young vs old and so on. However, what is striking is the confidence of Leave voters. Some 72% are confident a ‘good deal’ can be delivered. Now what a ‘good deal’ tangibly means to them and whether May can meet those expectations is going to be critical for her political survival. Meanwhile, we should also pay attention to the one area of the UK with the lowest confidence in any Brexit deal. That is Scotland where 62% are pessimistic that a ‘good deal’ can be reached. Ominous signs.

Much is made of the apparent finality of the 2016 vote in terms of the European question. It may very well be so given the state of the Labour Party right now. But I can’t help but feel that things could change and change quickly should Brexit negotiations go badly. You need tunnel vision not to see that there is a path for a ‘second referendum’ becoming a major political issue. In any case, we are now approaching the ‘business end’ of Brexit. The time for words is nearly over. Now Theresa May has to deliver.

Keiran Pedley presents the PB/Polling Matters podcast (latest episode below) and tweets about politics and public opinion at @keiranpedley


Check out the latest podcast below:

Notes on the poll: Opinium surveyed a nationally representative sample of 2,003 GB adults online between 17-21 March, 2017. Tables will be available on their website in due course.


Growing in size Britain’s weirdest voting group: The Kippers who now think leaving the EU is wrong

Friday, March 24th, 2017

Over the last few months, as those who follow the site will know, I have been writing posts and tweets about the YouGov Brexit tracker which come which comes out two or three times a month. The actual question is “In hindsight do you think Britain was right or wrong to vote to leave the EU?”

The overall picture is that the gap between those who think the outcome was wrong has and those right has narrowed and for the last two surveys it has been level-pegging.

One of the features of this that always seems to get attention is the number of current UKIP supporters who declare that they think it is wrong in hindsight for Britain to have voted to leave the EU.

When this was just one or two percent it could be just put down to polling respondents clicking the wrong boxes as can happen with multi question online survey forms. In the most recent polling the UKIP numbers edged up and the this week’ YouGov polling has 7% of current UKIP supporters saying they believe it was wrong for Britain to vote LEAVE.

So I thought I would produce a chart showing how this is going and here it is at the top ofthe post. The numbers are, of course, small and this is measuring a subset with all the dangers that that entails but the fact that we see the pattern in the chart, I suggest, says something. I’m not quite sure what.

Mike Smithson


Article 50 will be invoked next week with the country still totally split over whether it is the right thing to do

Thursday, March 23rd, 2017

The YouGov tracker is not shifting either way

If the Prime Minister was hoping that the ending of the parliamentary approval process for Article 50 would swing opinion more behind the move then she is going to be disappointed.

The latest YouGov tracker came out shortly before the Westminster terror attack and as can be seen in the chart the country is still totally divided on whether it is a good thing or a bad thing. There’s been very little movement since TMay became leader last July.

This is very much sets the scene for the coming months and TMay has two very different audiences to satisfy – those who want out and those who don’t. The the result on June 23rd was very close and the trend in the chart suggests that that is how it remains.

It is only the presence of Corbyn who was ambivalent to BREXIT that gives her some relief. She’s not facing someone who has the ability to exploit the situation.

Does she put the emphasis on curtailing immigration at the expense of the economy or vice versa? There’ll be huge pressures either way.

I love trackers like this because the same question is asked in the same manner every time.

Mike Smithson


The great REMAIN LEAVE divide reflected in the areas that have Premiership football clubs

Wednesday, March 22nd, 2017

Footballing success comes to the places that voted against BREXIT

Correlation, of course, is not causation but we hear so much these days about whether a particular area voted LEAVE or REMAIN that I thought it might be interesting to examine how this worked out in the English Premiership League.

I’ve taken the BREXIT splits in the local authority areas where each of the 20 current members of the league are. Note that the two Manchester clubs have different numbers because only City is in Manchester itself. United is in Trafford. Crystal Palace is on the border of four London boroughs and the split relates to Borough of Croydon where the ground is.

The clubs themselves are listed in terms of their current Premiership ranking with Chelsea at the top and Sunderland at the bottom.

The green on the chart reflects the REMAIN vote share last June 23rd and the red the LEAVE one.

    The most successful clubs currently all were in areas which voted voted REMAIN while the clubs that are struggling and face relegation all voted LEAVE

This is not really surprising because the big Premiership clubs are in the big regional centres which are generally more prosperous and people there tended to want to remain within the EU.

The clubs that are struggling tend to be in slightly less major urban centres, have fewer graduates, and a very different employment pattern.

Next season the Premiership BREXIT split will be different assuming that Newcastle (REMAIN 50.7%) and Brighton (REMAIN 68%) get promoted and two of the current bottom three relegated.

Mike Smithson


Blindsided. Leavers have given the PM a free rein over the Article 50 negotiations and they’ll come to regret it

Sunday, March 19th, 2017

From now on Theresa May can ignore Parliament

Theresa May has striven mightily at every stage to avoid Parliamentary restraint on her Brexit negotiations with the rest of the EU.  She fought in the courts to the bitter end against the principle that the triggering of Article 50 required the prior approval from Parliament.  A White Paper was extracted out of the government in a manner akin to that used by Lord Olivier in Marathon Man.  The White Paper thus extracted was so anodyne that vanilla seemed tangy after reading it.  The Article 50 Bill was pushed through Parliament with every attempt to place any restraint on the way in which the government negotiates Brexit stripped out.  It received Royal Assent on Wednesday in pristine form.  The only commitment that the Government has given is to allow a vote on the final deal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Leaving it would mean that Britain left the EU without any deal at all.  So from now on, Theresa May can ignore Parliament.

Throughout all of this process, Theresa May has been aided and abetted by the ardent Leavers and their press supporters.  Judges were vilified for issuing inconvenient judgments, to the point of being described as enemies of the people.  The more hardcore Leavers contemplated the abolition of the House of Lords when it sought to impose conditions on the Article 50 Bill.  They are no doubt surveying the outcome with great satisfaction.

Those Leavers who are regarded on their own side as intellectuals have often stressed how Brexit would restore Parliamentary sovereignty.  Yet they have fought tooth and nail to remove Parliament’s role in the exit process.  These are Augustinian Leavers – Lord give me Parliamentary sovereignty, but not yet.

But they do not seem to realise what they have done.  Because this was never a battle between Leavers and Remainers.  This was, as the courts explained in their judgments in the Article 50 case, a question of where power lay between the Government and Parliament.  The courts concluded that Parliament held the power to initiate the triggering of Article 50.

Throughout the Second World War, Parliament debated war aims, strategy and progress.  Chamberlain fell over just such a debate.  No matter how keen many Leavers are on analogies from the 1940s, even they would struggle to describe Brexit as operating on a higher plane than a global war.  But the Leaver MPs have fallen far below their predecessors, acting as lobby fodder to abdicate their role to the Government.  From now on, the executive has complete control.

It is important to understand what that means.  Between the triggering of Article 50 (A Day) and the day of Brexit (B Day), Theresa May’s government can set whatever policy it thinks fit.  It is far from clear that policy will be one of hard Brexit.  The negotiations have not yet started.  No one yet knows where they are going to finish.  Unless there is no deal at all, the deal will involve compromise on the British side in some ways.  And if the Government compromises in some ways, we can expect the ultra-orthodox Leavers to be outraged.

But they will have no direct outlet for that outrage.  The Government negotiations are not to be controlled by Parliament.  Ministers may be brought before select committees, whose members may huff and puff, but ultimately if a deal is struck it will be put before Parliament on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  Given the balance of the House of Commons, that deal will be taken.  The ultra-orthodox Leavers have voted for their own impotence.  By B Day, their vision of a Britain with no ties to the EU of any kind might well have been flushed down the pan.

Now imagine that the House of Commons had approached this differently, with a will to ensure that it kept a tight rein on the Government.  Given the small majority of the Government in the House of Commons, a relatively small number of Conservative MPs on either side of the party (perhaps even working in concert) could have secured this.  The Government could then have been required to explain its approach to MPs and win their support for approach on broad policy decisions.  The Government would have been forced to do the hard thinking that David Davis freely admitted before the select committee this week had not yet been undertaken.  It might even have helped build that consensus that the Prime Minister is set to tour the nation to build.

So when the Leaver MPs are betrayed, as in their own minds they most certainly will be, and Brexit is not negotiated to their complete satisfaction, they are going to be unable to express themselves through normal Parliamentary means.  The newspaper front pages will no doubt scream, but they will do so largely impotently.

How will the hardline Leavers continue their campaign?  They’ve just helped to close off the conventional route.  But that frustration will find a vent somehow.  But how?

Alastair Meeks


UKIP: circling the whirlpool

Saturday, March 18th, 2017

How does Nuttall save his party from irrelevance?

UKIP was very good for Brexit: if the party had never been created, Britain would almost certainly still be a member of the European Union.* Brexit, by contrast, has been disastrous for UKIP. Stripped of their two greatest assets – their mission and by far their most effective leader – UKIP has struggled since last July to find a purpose or a direction. Compounded by internal divisions, the estrangement of their major funder, and a gaffe-prone leadership, you might have expected that the inevitable result would be a major hit to their polling. In fact, it’s not quite as simple as that.

During the referendum campaign, UKIP was consistently polling in the mid- to upper-teens (with the exception of Mori), peaking at a 20% share reported by YouGov on 26 April 2016. Perhaps not coincidentally, that poll also reported the lowest Con share this parliament (30%) and the joint-biggest Lab lead (3%).

Immediately after their crowning triumph on 23 June last year, UKIP suffered an immediate drop in their support. In the month before the referendum, UKIP averaged 16.7%. That dropped to just 13.0% in July but by February 2017, the monthly average was still 12.6%: near enough the same given the different pollsters and methodologies. Since then, however, UKIP’s difficulties – exemplified by Nuttall’s difficult by-election campaign in Stoke Central – might finally have caught up with them.

The 6% that Mori reported this week is, on the face of it, pretty awful but in fact Mori have published very low scores for UKIP for some months: they returned 6% in August and October 2016, and January 2017 as well. Even so, the most rosy interpretation is that the party’s treading water. Unfortunately, that seems less likely when set against the other polls this week: the first single-digit UKIP score reported by YouGov since February 2013 (which also reported UKIP back behind the Lib Dems), and the joint-lowest share with ICM since 2015.

That polling data is backed up in real votes too. UKIP has never been good at by-elections or local elections (and, to be fair, focussing on these was never intrinsic to the party’s mission in a way that it is for, say, the Lib Dems). Even so, this week’s by-elections saw UKIP drop two-thirds of their share in two of the four elections, poll only 5% in another and not contest the fourth – and while they may have been unusually poor results even by UKIP’s standards, they weren’t that atypical of recent weeks.

Where is this pointing? In the first instance, UKIP’s recent decline seems to have been good for the Tories. While the hackneyed cliché of UKIP as Tories-on-holiday was at best a gross simplification, there is a definite mirror to the graph of the Con and UKIP lines this parliament. So while UKIP’s support overall might be a lot more diverse than ex-Con, the movement that’s gone to and from it could well be primarily among Con-sympathetic voters. Certainly, current polling indicates that the great majority of UKIP lost support is to the Conservatives. Hence why UKIP’s March decline has propelled the Tories up into the mid-40s.

(We should, as an aside, note just how extraordinary that Con figure is, even before the context of fiscal restraint, botched budget PR and a difficult Brexit process is taken into account. The 44% that ICM and YouGov reported is a higher share of the GB electorate than Margaret Thatcher won in 1983).

All of which augers very ill for UKIP’s prospects in May. 2013 marked UKIP’s breakthrough in council elections, where they finished third in the national vote and returned a net gain of 139 seats. In many cases, local government hasn’t been a happy experience for the party adding to the problems at a national level. The likely result is a loss of a great many of these seats. The only saving grace for UKIP is that the losses probably won’t receive much coverage: the top-line political reporting will focus on Labour’s performance.

That, however, should be scant consolation. It is too soon to declare UKIP to be in a death-spiral. Political parties are resilient things and it takes a lot to kill them off. UKIP still has issues it can make its own – withdrawal from the ECHR, for example – and of course, the government could yet hand it a reprieve depending on what deal it strikes to leave the EU. Immigration also still has the capacity to attract voters to UKIP, though a hard Brexit and an associated economic downturn would likely reduce numbers. Indeed, short of a rejuvenating Soft Brexit, it’s hard to see the other parties consistently allowing UKIP enough space to thrive on domestic policy. Through the first decade of this century, UKIP tended to poll 2-3%. Given their failure to grasp their opportunities since last July, it’s not unreasonable to think that before long they might be back there.

David Herdson

* As with all alternate histories, it’s impossible to know what would have happened had Eurosceptic activists and voters remained with the main parties. The Conservative Party in particular would have been a different beast, with possible meaningful consequences from the 2005 leadership election onwards. Similarly, the 2010 election wouldn’t take much tipping to produce a different outcome and – consequently – a very different future for the UK. That said, even with additional Eurosceptic agitation within the Conservatives, it’s unlikely that an outright Leaver would have been elected leader before 2015, and then only in opposition. The best (for Leavers) that might have happened is some analogue to reality, with an In/Out referendum promised in order to resolve internal tensions rather than in response to the external threat posed by UKIP. More likely is that divisions over Europe would have so split the party that irrespective of who led it, the Tories would have returned to opposition and, hence, be incapable of implementing any policy. And even if the Tories were in government and did grant a referendum, Leave would have gone into the vote without the nucleus that UKIP in reality provided, making it much more likely that Remain would have won.


Mrs. May’s government suffers a second defeat in the Lords on the BREXIT bill

Tuesday, March 7th, 2017


The €60 billion question. The EU exit charge and what it means

Sunday, March 5th, 2017

Picture: The front page of yesterday’s Times newspaper.

Alastair Meeks, who accurately predicted the outcome of the Article 50 case, looks at the looming Brexit divorce settlement.

One of the many points that will be up for discussion as part of Britain leaving the EU is what Britain will pay as part of the divorce settlement, if anything.  Michel Barnier, the EU’s negotiator, is reportedly making a demand for €60 billion his opening gambit.  The UK government, backed up by a House of Lords committee, asserts that it does not need to pay a penny.  Who is right?  And what does this dispute mean?

It is customary in articles such as this to start with an explanation of the argument.  Customary, but entirely wrong, because the looming argument is secondary to the negotiation it will form part of.  Britain is about to start the process of negotiating its exit from the EU.  The two sides are seeking to reach an agreed set of terms that each regards as advantageous as possible.  Those terms may well ultimately bear relatively little resemblance to the pre-existing obligations on both sides, depending on each side’s negotiating priorities and their relative strengths.

The pre-existing position is relevant only because it helps define the position if no agreement is reached and in helping to construct rationales for the arguments that each side wishes to put forward.  The law is only relevant if no agreement is reached.  In those circumstances, the matter would be litigated and an answer would eventually be obtained, but all that would be incidental to the disorderly Brexit that would then be taking place.

So to understand this dispute we can put the intricacies of the law to one side for now.  Let’s concentrate on the more important aspect.  What are the two parties trying to achieve through this argument?

For this we do need a bit of context.  The EU has, as part of its usual activities incurred present liabilities that will fall due in the future.  A good example of this is in my own area of expertise, its future pension commitments.  One of the questions to be settled is what Britain will need to contribute to these costs.

The EU’s starting figure of €60 billion is making a statement.  The FT looked at the possible extent of the liabilities in October 2016 and came up with a figure of €20 billion as a plausible upper estimate.  Newspapers are not known for their understatement of potential problems in reports.  The estimate of €60 billion looks like a typical builder’s “double the first number you think of and add a drink on top” estimate.  The number is no doubt intended as a statement to be heard by the UK government.  The statement is clear: you can expect a very hard time in negotiations, we think our negotiating hand is very strong, we think time is on our side and we are not too concerned if no deal is reached.

The British government’s response might be understood in kind, though slightly more muted.  The British government is not saying that it will not pay a penny, merely that it is not obliged to.

I have to say, however, that the British government’s response so far looks poor on at least three different levels. 

1) The nuance in that response was completely lost in the newspaper headlines.

If Britain does end up paying a substantial sum, which has to be the overwhelming probability if any deal is to be reached, those headlines will be recalled by the public but the implied qualification will not.  The response only works with the public if no deal is to be reached.

2) The government appears to be attempting to play poker using strategies more appropriate to bridge.  By entering into legal arguments about the amount to be paid, it opens up a discussion that the EU negotiators will relish getting into about legal niceties on a point that it very much suits them to discuss.

There are various possible strategies that the British government could follow.  For example, it could describe such a gambit as one that indicated that the EU were negotiating in bad faith, seeking the removal of the negotiators who put forward such a manifestly outrageous demand. Or it could link such a discussion to a related discussion on far more congenial territory (such as ownership of shared EU assets).  In short, it should be bringing in new dimensions into a negotiation that it suits the other negotiating party to treat as one dimensional.

3) The British government’s response looks both morally and legally weak.  If Britain has been part of an organisation that has entered into long term commitments, seeking to wash its hands of any responsibility to pay for them after the fact is not a lofty position to take.

The legal argument is scarcely better.  It apparently turns on the phrasing of Article 50 of the EU Treaty, which reads at the relevant point: “The Treaties [of the EU] shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification.”

The argument floated in the newspapers is that Article 70 of the Vienna Convention means that brings all Britain’s liabilities to an end.  That article provides that:

“Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the termination of a treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the present Convention:

(a) Releases the parties from any obligation further to perform the treaty”.

But this ignores two points.  First, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides:

“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”

So the exit provisions in Article 50 need to be given appropriate meaning for handling the withdrawal from a complex multinational treaty of one of its members.  It is implausible that exiting members would be intended to leave without paying up their share of pre-existing commitments.  Its words should be read accordingly.  It is more natural in that context to read Britain’s release from any obligation further to perform the treaty as being restricted to obligations after that date rather than to wipe the slate completely clean.

And secondly, Article 70 does not finish with the words quoted in the newspapers.  It goes on to provide:

“[Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the termination of a treaty…] (b) Does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination.”

This would also seem to give Britain responsibility for its share of future EU liabilities already incurred at a time that Britain was a party to them.

As I said at the outset, the legal argument really isn’t very relevant, unless negotiations break down completely.  But while it’s bad enough playing bridge at a poker table, it’s worse still doing so and then fumbling your cards.

Alastair Meeks